Statutes of Repose and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by Ference, Garris G
“One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship 
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on 
the outcome of no elections."
- Justice Robert Jackson, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 
(1943).
Statutes of Repose and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution
Garris Ference
14 June 2006
Environmental Law and Toxic Torts
Professor Steven Davison
2Introduction
The right of sick or injured people to at least have a day in court is fundamental to 
the notion of equal protection and should not vary depending on the result of any election 
or misguided legislative whim. The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, which states in part that “no state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”1 would seem to 
further the notion held by the founders of our country that all people are created equal 
and possess certain inalienable rights to be regulated by state and local governments in 
the same way.2 However, state legislatures, often with the acquiescence of courts, have 
done their best to mold and modify this freedom, often with awkward results.
An area where such awkward results have been particularly apparent is state 
statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Statutes of limitation are statutes in civil and 
criminal codes which set forth the maximum period of time, after certain events, in which 
legal proceedings based on those events may be commenced. Statutes of repose, on the 
other hand, extinguish any right to a cause of action after a proscribed amount of time –
even if the potential claimant has no knowledge that the potential cause of action may 
exist.3 While this paper will focus mainly on the application of the 14th Amendment’s 
equal protection clause to state statutes of repose, this paper also will examine statutes of 
1
 See United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 2.
2
 The 5th Amendment Due Process clause has been interpreted as containing an equal protection 
requirement applicable to the federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
3
 See page 3, infra, for further discussion of statutes of repose and statutes of limitation.
3limitation as a necessary complement in any discussion of statutes of repose.4
This paper attempts to present a balanced analysis of the reasons why many 
commentators find that statutes of repose are anathema to the principle of equal 
protection under the law; and why many commentators argue that time periods for 
statutes of repose should, at the very least, be lengthened, if not phased out altogether. 
First, this paper will argue that a statute of repose that only applies to a particular type of 
legal claim is invalid under the equal protection clause because it irrationally 
discriminates against only particular types of legal claims, in violation of the rational 
basis test for equal protection. Secondly, this paper argues that if a state has a statute or 
statutes of repose that apply/applies to all legal claims, such a statute or statutes, in order 
to comply with the equal protection clause’s rational basis test, must establish a 
reasonable repose period for each type of legal claim, with the repose period for each 
type of claim required to be based upon the relevant latency or discovery period for the 
disease or injury upon which a particular legal claim is based.
Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitation
Statutes of limitation “are found and approved in all systems of enlightened 
jurisprudence.”5 They represent the legislative judgment that an adversary should have 
reasonable notice to defend within a specified period of time and therefore “the right to 
be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”6
Statutes of limitation “find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in 
4
 Much of the background information discussing statutes of repose appearing is this article has recently 
been discussed in Note, Excuses, Excuses: The Application of Statutes if Repose to Environmentally-
Related Injuries, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 345 (2006). Unlike that note, this paper argues that statutes of 
repose limited to specific legal claims are unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.
5 Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
6 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
4logic.”7 They “are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate 
between the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and unavoidable delay.”8 The plea 
of limitations is considered “a meritorious defense, in itself serving a public interest.”9
Statutes of repose, however, are different from statutes of limitation. A statute of 
repose establishes a “right not to be sued,” rather than a “right to sue.”10 A statute of 
repose “limits the time within which an action may be brought and is unrelated to the 
accrual of any cause of action.”11 Statutes of limitation have been described as affecting 
only a party’s remedy for a cause of action, while the running of a statute of repose serves 
to “nullify both the remedy and the right.”12 A statute of repose begins to run after a 
“triggering event,” which is the event that “starts the clock running on the time allowed 
for filing suit.”13
There is also a procedural difference between statutes of limitation and statutes of 
repose: “Statutes of limitation, though they can have a material effect on the outcome of a 
case, are usually characterized as procedural.”14 On the other hand, “a statute of repose is 
substantive . . . it relates to the jurisdiction of the court and any failure to commence the 
action within the applicable time period extinguishes the right itself and divests the ... 
7 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. at 314.
8 Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 
325 U.S. at 314).
9 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938).
10 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2005).
11 Hayes v. General Motors Corp., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22345 (6th Cir. 1996); Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 
S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 
(Tenn. 1995).
12
 See Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 S.W.2d at 276; Via v. General Elec. Co., 799 F. Supp. 837, 839 (W.D. Tenn. 
1992).
13 Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co. Inc., 924 S.W. 2d 98 (Tenn. App. 1995).
14 Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 1984).
5court of any subject matter jurisdiction which it might otherwise have.”15 These 
distinctions are important when distinguishing between statutes of limitation and statutes 
of repose for purposes of equal protection analysis or when a federal court considers 
frequently litigated questions involving an Erie issue (i.e., whether a federal court, sitting 
under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, should follow a state statute of repose or 
limitation).16
Statutes of limitation and statutes of repose both serve to meet the goals described 
in the proceeding paragraphs. However, statutes of repose possess more of an air of 
absolute finality and in this way can be seen to have evolved beyond the protection 
afforded to wrongdoers by statutes of limitation. In Texas, for example, statutes of repose 
are considered to “represent a response by the legislature to the inadequacy of traditional 
statutes of limitations.”17 Statutes of repose “terminate any right of action after a specific 
time has elapsed, regardless of whether or not there has as yet been an injury”18 to the 
plaintiff. A repose statute “begins to run from the occurrence of some event other than the
event of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action and, therefore, bars a cause of action 
before the injury occurs.”19 Also, “a statute of limitation ... cuts off the remedy” whereas 
“a statute of repose limits the time during which a cause of action can arise and usually 
15 Hayes v. General Motors Corp., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22345 (6th Cir. 1996); Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 
S.W.2d at 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 
(Tenn. 1995).
16
 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 517 
U.S. 1102 (1996).
17 Tex. Gas Exploration Corp. v. Fluor. Corp., 828 S.W.2d 28 at 32 (Tex. App. 1991) (discussing the Texas 
statute of repose that applies to claims against architects and builders). 
18 Hoffner v. Johnson, 2003 ND 79, 660 N.W.2d 909, 913 (2003).
19 Id., 913.
6runs from an act of a defendant. It abolishes the cause of action after the passage of time 
even though the cause of action may not have occurred yet.”20
Much criticism has been leveled at the absurd results created by statutes of repose 
when a claimant's potential claim is barred before a claimant even has reason to know of 
a potential cause of action against the defendant.21 For example, a person could be 
exposed to a chemical or pollutant that does not result in any immediate symptoms of 
disease. After a period of time longer than that proscribed by a statute of repose has run, 
this person discovers that they now suffer from a disease or illness as a result of the 
exposure. Since the elapsed time period is longer than the period allowed under the 
applicable statute of repose to bring suit, any claim filed in a court by that person is thus 
extinguished by the applicable statute of repose. Courts have stated somewhat obtusely 
that the statute of repose:
requires an unfortunate result . . .  especially since plaintiff’s injury was 
not ascertainable before the statute extinguished her right to bring the 
action, and her suit would have been timely had the amended statute not 
intervened. It is clear, however, that the legislature has the authority to set 
statutes of limitation, that the classification of ‘health care providers’ is 
justified and reasonable, and without constitutional infirmity.22
Despite this illogical result, courts have declared that “it is clear that the legislature has 
the constitutional power to enact statutes of repose which, by definition, have the possible 
effect of barring a claim before it occurs.”23 Many courts wash their hands of 
constitutional challenges to statutes of repose by stating brusquely that the results of these 
20 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d at 363.
21 Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co. Inc., 924 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Tenn. App. 1995).
22 Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass’n., 631 P.2d 222, 226 (Kan. 1981).
23 Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co. Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 103; see also Jones v. Five Star Engineering, Inc., 717 
S.W.2d 882, at 883 (Tenn. 1986)(upholding constitutionality of Tennessee Product Liability Act statute of 
repose); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup Assoc., Inc., 619 
S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981).
7statutes mark a legislative decision, and “its wisdom is not the concern of courts.”24 In 
addition, one court has stated that “the very purpose of a statute of repose is to create a 
settled time when such losses can no longer be subject to claims. Ample authority 
establishes a governmental right to do this even though harsh results can occur under any 
such arbitrary time limit.”25
Statutes of repose have been enacted in some states for products liability cases, 
for medical treatment cases, for claims arising from many types of chemical and 
environmental exposures, and for a wide range of other potential tort claims involving the 
potential development of future injuries from various causes.26 A majority of states have 
also passed statutes of repose limiting the time in which an action can be brought against 
architects, builders, and material suppliers for defects arising from improvements to real 
property.27 Statutes of repose are coming under more criticism of late, including a recent 
note which discusses the application of statutes repose to actions where liability arises 
due to improvements to real property as well as to certain environmental and toxic tort 
claims.28
Statutes of repose take many forms. Usually, they establish a total ban on 
particular types of suits after a set period of time, which can range anywhere from a few 
years to a few decades. In Texas for example, “a claimant must commence a products 
liability action against a manufacturer or seller of a product before the end of 15 years 
24 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. at 123.
25 Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1984).
26
 See e.g. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code §16.008(2005); Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code §16.009(2005).
27
 See e.g. Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (2005)(amended in 1986 to shorten the limitation period from 15 to ten 
years); Cal Code Civ Proc § 337.1 (2006)(four years); Md. COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Code Ann. § 5-108 (2006)(20 years); MCLS § 600.5839 (2005)
(10 years); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-250 (2006)(five years).
28
 Note, Excuses, Excuses: The Application of Statutes if Repose to Environmentally-Related Injuries, 33 
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 345 (2006).
8after the date of sale of the product by the defendant.”29 In Tennessee, the legislature has 
enacted a ten-year statute of repose for products liability claims against product 
manufacturers and sellers.30
States offer a variety of reasons for statutes of repose, many of which are fairly 
similar. In Tennessee, the preamble to the state’s product liability statute of repose 
suggests a legislature concerned about “the effect of increased insurance premiums and 
increased claims” upon the cost of products as a result of “manufacturers, wholesalers 
and retailers passing the cost of the premium to the consumer” and about “certain product 
manufacturers [being] discouraged from continuing to provide and manufacture such 
products because of the high cost and possible unavailability of product insurance.”31 In 
North Dakota courts have observed that “it is necessary to protect the public interest by 
enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to 
provide products liability insurance.”32 Minnesota has determined that “by setting forth a 
15-year period of repose, the statute helps avoid litigation and stale claims which could 
occur many years after an improvement to real property has been designed, manufactured 
or installed.”33
It is possible that the types of arguments discussed in the previous paragraph 
might be extended to suits against any type of business or professional for alleged 
tortious conduct that involves any type of environmental or toxic tort claim. Since any 
defendant who is held liable for tortuous conduct may face increased insurance premiums 
29
 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.012(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) quoted in Burlington Northern 
& Santa Fe R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d at 358.
30 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (2005).
31
 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (2005); See also Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d at 1137.
32 N.D. Cent. Code, § 28-01-01 (2005).
33 Sartori v. Harnischfeger, 432 N.W.2d 448, at 453 (Minn. 1988).
9and/or reduced profits that may increase the price it charges for its product and/or service 
or decrease the amount it pays its employees in salaries and wages, these facts would 
seem to offer strong policy reasons for having a broad, generic statute of repose that is 
not limited to specific types of legal claims against any specific profession or industry.
Exceptions to Statutes of Repose
Even though statutes of repose are presumed valid under the equal protection 
clause, many states provide an exception from statutes of repose where claims based on 
injuries from exposure to asbestos are involved. The typical asbestos exception mirrors 
Tennessee’s, which states: “the foregoing limitation of actions shall not apply to any 
action resulting from exposure to asbestos.”34 The reason for this exception to the statute 
of repose, as stated by the 6th Circuit, is that “we think the statute’s exemption of 
asbestos-related injuries has a rational basis if only because such injuries often take 
considerably longer than ten years to manifest themselves.”35 Another exception to 
Tennessee's statute of repose was added in 1993 for actions arising from the use of 
silicone gel breast implants, ostensibly due to the cruel nature of a claim being 
extinguished even though the potential claimant had no knowledge of any problem until 
after the period allowed by the statute.36
In light of these exceptions to statutes of repose that some states have enacted, 
potential claimants in those states seeking redress for non-exempted injuries have 
attempted to argue that other medical conditions and diseases are analogous to asbestos 
and that such exception provisions violate equal protection by not including such non-
34
 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (2005).
35 Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d at 1138; Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 
1153 (6th Cir. 1981).
36
 See 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Chapter 457, §§ 1,2 effective May 26, 1993.
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exempted injuries.37 These claimants argue that if discoverability is the reason for an 
asbestos exception, then logically any claim where discoverability problems are involved 
should be granted a similar exception.
The fairly uniform court response to these arguments has been that “we find 
unconvincing appellants’ argument that ‘there is absolutely no rational basis for 
exempting asbestos-related injuries from the ten year absolute bar for bringing a products 
liability claim and not exempting other long term continuing type injuries such as injuries 
relating to exposure to low level radiation.”38 Yet this response seems to beg the question, 
offering an answer without a rational supporting explanation. If problems with the 
discoverability of a legal claim are the basis for such exceptions, then there should be an 
exception from a statute of repose for any legal claim which could not reasonably be 
discovered during the repose period - and therefore the repose period for a particular legal 
claim should be based upon the reasonable period required for a person to discover the 
existence of the legal claim.
Another argument, in favor of expanding the asbestos exception to other similar 
claims, has been that “the right of access to the courts is a fundamental right” so any 
classification “arbitrarily and capriciously distinguishing between asbestos-related 
claims” and any other type of exposure is a violation of equal protection under the law.39
Courts have been content in denying any such similarity, since recognition of such a 
similarity would require exemptions for claims based on symptoms similar to the 
asbestos and other similar exceptions, even though not within the exact specific statutory 
exception. In Tennessee, for example, a state statute of repose prescribes that “in any 
37
 Spence v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 37 F.3d 1185, 1191 (6th Cir. 1994).
38 Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d at 404.
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event, the action must be brought within ten (10) years from the date on which the 
product was first purchased for use or consumption (emphasis added).”40 The only 
conclusion offered by a court in support of this statute’s discrimination is that “although 
the conclusion may be harsh, we are bound by the plain language of the Tennessee 
legislature” as “the plain language of the statute allows for no exceptions.”41 The only 
consolation offered by the court is “crocodile tears”: “the court recognizes and regrets 
appellants’ losses.”42
The harshness of literal interpretation of the language of exception provisions in 
statutes of repose is based upon a lack of recognition that the role of a court should not be 
simply to be a rubber stamp for the legislature. Challenges to statutes of repose are 
further exacerbated by the burden presented to a person challenging the constitutionality 
of a statute since “a statute is presumed constitutional unless proven otherwise beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”43 Although the exceptions to statutes of repose carved out for asbestos 
exposure and silicon gel breast implants are limited, even with these exceptions 
seemingly restricting the overall negative impacts of statutes of repose as a whole, most 
arguments based on statutes of repose being unconstitutional, as a denial of equal 
protection, have fared poorly.
Overview of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
There are two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be invoked when a 
person seeks to have state legislation declared unconstitutional. The first states that no 
39 Id. at 402.
40
 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b) (2005) as quoted in Hayes v. General Motors Corp., 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 22345 (6th Cir. 1996).
41 Id.
42 Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d at 404.
43 Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1986) (citing Minnesota Higher 
Education Facilities Authority v. Hawk, 305 Minn. 97, 232 N.W.2d 106 (1975)).
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state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”44
The second declares that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”45 In explaining equal protection, Justice Robert Jackson 
stated that “courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to 
require that laws be equal in operation.”46 Equal application of the law is necessary since 
“we are much more likely to find arbitrariness in the regulation of the few than of the 
many.”47
In describing equal protection requirements, Justice Jackson wrote: “I regard it as 
a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise their 
powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable 
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.”48 Justice Thurgood Marshall, a 
champion of expanded equal protection, wrote that equal protection “mandates nothing 
less than that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced [sic] shall be treated alike.’”49
However, application and analysis of equal protection principles by the courts are not as 
simple and straightforward as the general concept of equal treatment might suggest.
Current equal protection analysis by federal and state courts has identified three 
different levels of classification for governmental regulation, with each of the three levels 
being subject to separate standards of scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Rational 
basis scrutiny is the test that is usually used to evaluate whether a statute complies with 
44 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949); Chase Securities Corp. v. 
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945)
45
 See Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. at 111.
46 Id., 113.
47 Id., 113.
48 Id., 112.
49
 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 89 (1973) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. 
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)); see also DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 
1983); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977).
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equal protection requirements; the rational basis test requires a statute to have a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state interest.50 Under intermediate scrutiny, which applies to 
gender-based discrimination and discrimination against persons born illegitimately, a 
proposed state action must bear a substantial relationship to an important state interest.51
The “intermediate scrutiny” test is used in cases raising an equal protection challenge 
“where a statute implicates both an important right and a semisuspect sic class not 
accountable for its status.”52 Finally, strict scrutiny is applied when a statute discriminates 
either against conduct that is a fundamental constitutional right or on the basis of a 
suspect classification (race, religion, alienage); this test requires a statute to further a 
compelling state interest which could not be achieved by other means.53
Unless a party establishes that the intermediate or strict scrutiny test is applicable, 
a court typically uses the rational basis test as the proper approach when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute under the equal protection clause. Of the three equal 
protection tests, the rational basis test is the most deferential to the legislative branch of 
government. Under rational basis review a statute satisfies the requirements of equal 
protection if: “1) the classification created by the statute is rationally related to its 
legislative purpose; 2) the members of the class are treated like those similarly situated; 
and 3) the classification rests on some rational basis.”54 In other words, “a legislative 
action not affecting a suspect class or infringing upon a fundamental right is upheld if it is 
50
 See Jenkins v. Meares, 394 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1990); Ex parte Estate of Evans, 384 S.E.2d 748 (S.C. 
1989); Smith v. Smith, 354 S.E.2d 36 (S.C. 1987).
51 DeYoung v. Providence Medical Center, 960 P.2d 919, 921 (Wash. 1998).
52 Id. 921.
53
 See Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1984); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371 (1971); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 
(1973).
54 Jenkins v. Meares, 394 S.E.2d at 319; Ex parte Estate of Evans, 384 S.E.2d at 749; Smith v. Smith, 354 
S.E.2d at 39.
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rationally related toward the advancement of any legitimate legislative interests of 
society.”55 In addition, “to sustain the legislation” under the rational basis test, the 
government only “must show a reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably 
closely tailored to achieving that interest.”56
In determining if legislation is constitutional under the equal protection clause, 
only rights under the United States Constitution which are considered fundamental 
warrant strict scrutiny protection. By contrast, non-fundamental rights are reviewed under 
one of the lower levels of scrutiny. As a result, the determination of what constitutional 
rights are classified as fundamental rights is therefore of paramount importance in equal 
protection analysis. This issue has presented considerable controversy over the years for a 
variety of reasons. Since a legislature may not regulate or punish the exercise of a 
fundamental right unless strict scrutiny requirements are satisfied, if a statute regulates or 
denies a fundamental right then it usually is struck down as unconstitutional under the 
strict scrutiny test.
As noted above, equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative 
classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right57 or operates to the particular disadvantage of a suspect class.58 The 
Colorado Supreme Court has stated that “fundamental rights are essentially those rights 
55 King Bradwell Partnership v. Johnson Controls, 865 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tenn. App. 1993); Kochins v. 
Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1986).
56
 J. Marshall, dissenting, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, at 325 (1975). See 
also San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 124-126.
57 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1975). See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (right of a uniquely private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro 
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) 
(rights guaranteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 
(right to procreate).
58
 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 
(1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry).
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which have been recognized as having a value essential to individual liberty in our 
society.”59 Fundamental rights include voting, privacy, interstate travel, and the freedoms 
of speech and association.60 A suspect class includes any group of people “saddled with 
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian sic political process.”61 Suspect classifications include 
race, alienage, and national origin.62 In addition, the suspect class must be a “discrete and 
insular group”63 in need of legislative protection.
These categories and classifications undergo a constant state of analysis and are 
open to re-consideration and review despite the principle of stare decisis. Justice 
Thurgood Marshall almost always took a broader view than many other Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court as to what should be considered a fundamental right. Justice 
Marshall noted that “whether ‘fundamental’ or not ‘the right of the individual . . . to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life’ has been repeatedly recognized by this 
Court as falling within the concept of liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”64 Even as long ago as 1884 Justice Bradley stated that the right to work “is 
an inalienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase ‘pursuit of happiness’ in 
the Declaration of Independence . . . This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of 
the citizen.”65
59 Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, at 1015 n. 7 (Colo. 1982).
60
 See generally Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance & 
Procedure, 2nd., Section 15.7 (1992).
61 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
62
 See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
63 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938).
64
 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923).
65 Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884).
16
Nearly every state has a provision in their state's constitution stating that “no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”66 The 
United States Supreme Court has also noted that “all men are entitled to the equal 
protection of the law in their right to work for the support of themselves and families.”67
Finally, the Court has stated that “liberty means more than freedom from servitude, and 
the constitutional guarantee is an assurance that the citizen shall be protected in the right 
to use his powers of mind and body in any lawful calling.”68 Governmental employment, 
however, has been determined not to be a fundamental constitutional right.69
However, there is room for argument about which rights under “life, liberty, or 
property” are fundamental constitutional rights, and about whether particular 
discrimination in a specific statute’s regulatory scheme is justified, thus ensuring a 
healthy debate. As a result, the application of the equal protection clause to particular 
statutory discrimination can present some controversy as well as great difficulty. The 
United States Supreme Court has noted that “perfection in making the necessary 
classifications is neither possible nor necessary”70 and that a statute “does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by [it] are imperfect.”71
If a legislative classification “rationally furthers the purposes identified by the 
State, it does not violate the equal protection clause” when only the rational basis test is 
66
 South Carolina Constitution Article I, § 3.
67 Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914).
68
 See Smth v.Texas, 233 U.S. at 636. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sinderman, 
408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 
605-606 (1967); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-239 (1957); Slochower v. Board
of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Truax v. Raich, 239 
U.S. at 41.
69
 See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 
56, 73 (1972); Dandridge v. Willaims, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
70 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314.
71
 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 485.
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applicable.72 Under a rational basis review, the court must apply “a relatively relaxed 
standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions 
is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.”73 A classification established in a 
regulatory statute by a legislature is presumed to be valid,74 and overcoming this burden 
is quite difficult when only the rational basis test is applied. A statute's classification for 
regulatory purposes must rest only on a reasonable basis to survive a rational basis test 
challenge: for a statute to be held to violate equal protection under the rational basis test 
“it must be shown that it has no reasonable or natural relation to the legislative 
objective.”75
Many courts refer to the proposition that technical inequalities do not offend the 
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.76 Courts still adhere to the concept that 
“there is no constitutional requirement that a regulation, in other respects permissible, 
must reach every class to which it might be applied – and reject the proposition that a 
legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.77 The United 
States Supreme Court has noted that “the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a 
State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or (sic) not attacking the 
problem at all. It is enough that the State’s action be rationally based and free from 
72 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314. See also Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 
F.2d 1040, 1042-43 (6th Cir. 1984).
73 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314.
74
 See, e.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 
88 (1940); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); Kochins v. Kinden-Alimak, 
Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1135 (6th Cir. 1986).
75
 See City of Chattanooga v. Harris, 442 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. 1969); Phillips v. State, 304 S.W.2d 614 
(Tenn. 1957).
76 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36, 52 (1910); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 
U.S. at 78.
77 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 (1929); see also Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914); 
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 382 (1915); International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 215 
(1914); Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26, 29 (1913).
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invidious discrimination.”78 In addition, courts follow the principle that “a statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to 
justify it.”79
As equal protection analysis evolved, or was muddled (depending on one’s 
perspective), Justice Thurgood Marshall frequently found himself dissenting from the 
majority in cases involving equal protection challenges to a statute.80 A major problem 
with the Court’s equal protection analysis, according to Justice Marshall, consisted in the 
Court “apparently los[ing] interest in recognizing further ‘fundamental’ rights and 
‘suspect’ classes.”81 As Justice Jackson noted two decades earlier, “the equal protection 
clause ceases to assure either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable 
difference that can be pointed out between those bound and those left free.”82 Although 
some persons might not find a problem with the expansion of equal protection, in fact 
believing that the number of suspect classes has been stretched too broadly, it would 
seem counterintuitive to believe that mid-level and strict scrutiny equal protection 
analyses now have been extended to every possible group that deserves such heightened 
protection and that no further expansion of equal protection is necessary. Indeed, 
consideration of increased protection for new groups is what resulted in recognition of 
increased protection for the current groups that are now protected as suspect classes.
According to Justice Marshall, an approach of arbitrarily declining to further 
expand heightened scrutiny to new classes fails to further the pursuit of equality under the 
78 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 486-87.
79
 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 485, quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
80
 “Although we have called the right to work ‘of the very essence of the purpose of the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment to secure,’ Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), the Court finds that the right to work is not 
a fundamental right.” Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318.
81 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318-319.
82 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. at 115.
19
equal protection clause.83 Justice Marshall noted that “all interests not ‘fundamental’ and 
all classes not ‘suspect’ are not the same; and it is time for the Court to drop the pretense 
that, for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, they are.”84
Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens often joined Justice Marshall in dissent in 
equal protection cases. In a comment relevant to environmental law, one dissenting 
opinion by Justice Stevens discusses the discoverability factor involved in application of 
statutes of limitation in medical claim actions. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, 
commented:
The victim of medical malpractice frequently has no reason to believe that 
his legal rights have been invaded simply because some misfortune has 
followed medical treatment. Sometimes he may not even be aware of the 
actual injury until years have passed; at other times, he may recognize the 
harm but not know its cause; or . . . he may have knowledge of the injury 
and its cause, but have no reason to suspect that a physician has been 
guilty of any malpractice. In such cases – until today – the rule that has 
been applied in the federal courts is that the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until after fair notice of the invasion of the plaintiff’s legal 
rights.85
Justice Stevens also interestingly noted that even though statutes can be changed and 
adjusted by legislatures, the Supreme Court should not enforce unjust results as a way of 
providing the legislature with this authority.86
As a result, many medical malpractice claimants are now being told to be on the 
lookout for something having gone wrong for them from the date of enactment of a new 
statute of limitations. Justice Stevens seems to be suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court 
is encouraging potential medical malpractice claimants to look for potential legal claims 
83
 See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting education as a fundamental 
right); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (declining to treat women as a suspect class).
84 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979).
86
 J. Stevens, dissenting, United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rather than assume that other people with whom one is involved are not going to commit 
tortious acts. The problem of discoverability of certain problems arising from medical 
treatment of an illness is a major factor as to why statutes of repose for medical 
malpractice claims should be considered anathema to the pursuit of justice. Therefore, it 
should come as no surprise that there is little uniformity by courts in the application of 
equal protection standards to statutes of limitation and statutes of repose.
Arguments in Support of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose
In Kansas, the justification for statutes of repose mirrors that of many other states. 
A Kansas court has stated that medical statutes of repose mark, with no small degree of 
political spin, “the legislature’s attempt to assure quality health care . . . by combating the 
rapidly rising cost of medical malpractice insurance and the increasing reluctance of 
insurance underwriters to underwrite medical professionals.”87 Another court in Kansas 
went on to conclude “there is a reasonable basis for treating malpractice actions against 
health care providers differently from cases involving other tortfeasors.”88 A North 
Dakota court lamented that there was “an insurance crisis facing North Dakota products 
manufacturers” and a concomitant “crisis situation.”89 In Texas, a court has claimed that 
statutes of repose “are specifically designed to protect [manufacturers] . . . from 
protracted and extended vulnerability to lawsuits.”90 In Washington, a court has observed 
that “by enacting an eight-year statute of repose, the Legislature intended to protect 
insurance companies while ‘hopefully not resulting in too many individuals not getting 
87 Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass’n, 631 P.2d at 234-35 (Kan. 1981).
88 Schneider v. Liggett, 576 P.2d 221 (Kan. 1978).
89 Hoffner v. Johnson, 660 N.W.2d at 914.
90 Tex. Gas Exploration Corp. v. Fluor. Corp., 828 S.W.2d at 32. (discussing the Texas statute of repose 
that applies to claims against architects and builders).
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compensated.’”91 Again, these types of justifications for a statute of repose limited to 
particular types of legal claims against specific categories of persons are applicable to 
any type of legal claim against any type of business or professional.
In upholding statutes of repose, “courts have stressed the need to create a 
reasonable limit on the legal consequences of a wrong and the difficulty in proof of old 
claims.”92 Many courts have concluded that “a rational relation exists between the shorter 
limitation period for health care providers and the legitimate objective of providing 
quality health care.”93 Lower courts find encouragement in the United States Supreme 
Court’s position that liability limitations with an economic purpose are constitutional 
unless the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.94 Support for statutes of 
repose also has been found in the proposition that “when an act has an economic purpose, 
limitations created by it must be upheld unless they are irrational and arbitrary.”95 In 
addition, courts have stated that “limiting the time within which actions may be brought 
has in numerous cases been held to be a rational, non-arbitrary means of achieving 
economic ends.”96 Inevitably, economic considerations seep into courts’ analysis in 
support of statutes of repose.
Furthermore, a large number of judges are hesitant to issue any judgment or order 
without specific legislative authority. This view is often stated in this manner (or a 
similar manner): “this court cannot, after all, legislate – no matter how admirable its 
91
 WASHINGTON HOUSE JOURNAL, 44th Legis. Sess. 318 (1976) (comment by Representative Walt O. 
Knowles) quoted in DeYoung v. Providence Medical Center, 960 P.2d at 921.
92 Hoffner v. Johnson, 660 N.W.2d at 916.
93 Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984).
94
 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84, 88 (1979).
95 Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d at 403.
96 Id. at 403; see, e.g., Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1983); Buckner v. GAF Corp., 
495 F. Supp. 351, 353 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d, 659 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981); Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup 
Association, 619 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tenn. 1981).
22
objectives might be in doing so.”97 Courts also state that “sympathy for the plaintiff in 
this case, and those similarly situated, is not enough to compel this court”98 to overturn a 
valid statute.
Counter-Arguments/Criticism
Keeping costs down, however, is neither universally recognized nor accepted as a 
legitimate justification for a statute of repose. One argument against statutes of repose for 
product liability claims is that “product liability insurance rates are set on the basis of 
countrywide, rather than individual state, experience,” and “that there is little an 
individual state can do to solve the problems caused by products liability.”99 Another 
argument is based on numerous studies which have shown that “it is reported that 97% of 
all product related accidents occur within six years of the time the product is purchased 
and that a statute of repose precluding suit for actions accruing more than ten years after 
the product is sold will not significantly impact the product liability crisis.100 As a result, 
more judges are starting to agree that “some rational basis must be advanced for the 
selection of the specific period of years in a statute of repose's ‘bar’ or ‘repose,’ other 
than the economic interests . . . of insurance companies and physicians.”101
A state legislature's goal of keeping illegitimate claims from clogging the judicial 
branch of a state government certainly is a valid concern. However, statutes of repose 
seem to be designed primarily to prevent people from even having a day in court to try 
the substantive merits of a claim. If a claim is without substantive merit, without support 
97 DeYoung v. Providence Medical Center, 960 P.2d at 926.
98 Id.
99
 See Section 101, Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 714, 62,716 (1979).
100
 See Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitations – A New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977 Ins. 
L.J. 535, 542; McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of 
Repose, 30 Am. U.L. Rev. 579 (1981).
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from the benefit of witnesses' memories or documents, then the claim probably will fail 
on the substantive merits. The concern of a state legislature to keep claims from even 
being heard on the substantive merits in a state court seems an unfair and unreasonable 
basis for enactment of a statute of repose.
A  common judicial  argument  in support of a statute of repose is the argument 
that if one type of claim is granted or allowed, then "the sky will fall" as every claim 
necessarily will be allowed to be tried in state courts and "the slippery slope of chaos" 
would therefore reign supreme.102 This broad sweeping fear is unfounded. There is no 
reason to believe that all private insurance carriers will stop offering liability insurance to 
any or all businesses and/or professionals if there are no statutes of repose for product, 
business or professional liability claims in any state.
Furthermore, health care would continue to be available to most individuals and 
would be the highest quality even if statutes of repose for medical malpractice claims 
were abolished or extended. Those who espouse the virtues of the free market should 
surely recognize that there will always be a demand for quality health care; and thus there 
will always be physicians willing to provide such care.
In fact, the very basis of the exceptions in statutes of repose for asbestos and 
breast implants demonstrates that the decision to exclude some types of products liability 
claims for long latency illnesses, while allowing certain other claims to be tried in a 
state’s courts, is illogical and inconsistent. This inconsistency cannot be said to be a 
rational basis for a regulatory distinction under the equal protection clause and therefore 
should not be followed by a court when a statute of repose is challenged on equal 
101 Hoffner v. Johnson, 660 N.W.2d at 925; Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 1986 N.D. 
LEXIS 328 (1986).
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protection grounds. At the very least a statute of repose should have a period of repose 
somewhere between ten to thirty years (a period that is more reasonable than ten years) 
rather than between five to eight years (a less rational repose period).103
In many cases, state statutes of repose seem to have been enacted for the benefit 
of the customers of the insurance industry. For example, one state court found that “the 
legislative history [of that state’s statute of repose for medical malpractice claims] makes 
it crystal clear that the statute of repose was designed to remedy the rising cost of 
malpractice insurance."104 There is nothing wrong with assisting certain professionals and 
businessmen from attempting to control the costs of their insurance premiums and 
helping insurance companies to formulate a business plan to provide for the broadest 
possible coverage at the lowest possible costs. There is also nothing wrong with assisting 
a business to make reasonable profits. However, denying an injured person, who 
allegedly has been harmed by the tortious conduct of a professional or a businessman, the 
opportunity to try a meritorious claim on its substantive merits in court is anathema to the 
principles of freedom and justice that form the foundations of American jurisprudence.
A statute of repose that favors the rights of insured professionals and businessmen 
and their insurance companies’ rather than the rights of injured individuals cannot be 
justified by any rational policy. To avoid the appearance of unjustifiable favoritism of 
businessmen and professionals, courts have upheld statutes of repose on the more 
palpable sounding position that “the Equal Protection Clause does not demand for 
purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker [sic]
102
 See DeLoach v. Alfred, 191 Ariz. 82; 952 P.2d 320 (1998). 
103 Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d at 405.
104
 See hearing on S.B. 2348 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 44th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Feb. 5, 1975) 
(testimony of H.W. Wheeler, Counsel for the North Dakota Medical Association).
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actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.”105
This position is weak because to uphold a statute of repose, the underlying purpose of the 
legislature should be identified by the court and found to be irrational; however, the 
intent of the legislature may not be articulated explicitly on the face of a statute or in its 
legislative history, leaving a court to speculate as to the legislature's reasons for 
enactment of the statute even when the court is predisposed to dismiss a meritorious 
claim.
If a legal claim is stale or old, with a lack of witnesses or memories to support it, 
then this claim either will be barred by a statute of limitations or probably is not going to 
succeed on its substantive merits in a trial in court of such claim. There is really no need 
to rely upon a statute of repose to preemptively deny a claimant a day in court to try such 
a claim on the substantive merits.
Many state constitutions have an “open courts” provision to allow its citizens a 
day in court to try their claims on the merits106 but many courts have held that statutes of 
repose do not violate a state constitution's open courts provision because a statute of 
repose does not deny every injured party access to the courts, although the access 
permitted under the statute of repose only is for a limited time.107 In addition, many state 
constitutions contain an “open access to courts” provision; however, arguments based 
105 NL Indus., Inc. v. North Dakota State Tax Comm’r, 498 N.W.2d 141, 149 (N.D. 1993) (quoting 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1992).
106
 The constitutions of thirty-eight states contain open courts or right to remedy provisions and twenty-two 
state constitutions require that their state courts be "open." William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee's 
Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 
27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 333, 434-35 (1997). Many state constitutions contain some type of open courts 
provision and some type of right to remedy provision. Cf. id. See e.g. North Carolina Constitution Article I, 
§ 18.
107 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d at 361. See also McCollum v. 
Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Corp., 799 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Ky. 1990) (holding that the five-year 
medical malpractice statute of repose violated the open courts provisions of the state constitution).
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upon alleged violation of this principle have met with little success.108 Many courts have 
concluded that “there is no absolute right of access to the courts. All that is required is a 
reasonable right of access to the courts – a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”109
A similar right to a remedy provision is also contained in many state constitutions, 
and this type of provision has served as a successful basis for some challenges to a state 
statute of repose.110 This result could be due in part to the often heard colloquial: ‘a right 
without a remedy is no right at all.’ A state constitutional right to a remedy and a statute 
of repose seemingly are exclusive of one another because a person injured after the 
statutory period of repose is “left without a remedy for the injury.”111 However, a state 
legislature can restrict a time for filing a claim without violating a state constitution's 
right to a remedy provision so long as “it affords a reasonable time or fair opportunity to 
preserve a claimant’s rights . . . or if the amendment does not bar a remedy.”112 But 
neither the federal judiciary nor a state legislature should arbitrarily limit a claimant from 
even having a day in court to try the substantive merits of a claim.
However, reliance upon a state constitutional right to a remedy is an inadequate 
and limited approach to invalidate unjust statutes of repose. This conclusion is due in part 
to the fact that not every state constitution has such a provision and also because 
unconstitutional statutes of repose should be invalidated by all courts in their entirety all 
108 Spence v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 37 F.3d at 1191.
109 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 383 (quoted in Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d at 
403).
110 See Minn. Const. Art. 1, § 8; see also Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 80, 410 
N.W.2d 585, 588 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the five-year statute of repose as applied, violated the 
right-to-a-remedy clause of the state constitution).
111 Hoffner v. Johnson, 660 N.W.2d at 913.
112 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d at 358.
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at once; rather than only invalidated in states that have an appropriate right to a remedy 
provision in the state's constitution.113
Consequently, statutes of repose that apply only to particular types of legal claims 
should be invalidated by courts as unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection 
clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, not occasionally 
invalidated in some state courts on state constitutional grounds. For example, a decision 
by a particular state's appellate court invalidating a state statute of repose that bans claims 
against architects and builders might not necessarily support a challenge to a different 
statute of repose in that state governing claims in other fields.
An insurance company should draft its policies in ways that spread its costs of 
doing business among all its policy holders rather than simply closing the courthouse 
doors on many insured individual’s claims forever. Insurance policies could be structured 
so that an insured's premiums stay level each year (or even decrease), and only rise if a 
suit against the company is actually brought by an insured. Insurance rates should not 
necessarily increase for all of a company's policy holders every year. Even the necessity 
for profits and reasonable business growth does not require double digit growth in profits 
every year.
Under this author's suggested approach to statutes of repose, potential defendants 
would still have insurance coverage, insurance providers would enjoy reasonable profits, 
and the courts would be available to try insurance claims on their substantive merits if 
harm occurs to an insured. In addition, a potential claimant, whose claims are not barred 
113
 See e.g., Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 817 (Ky. 1991) (finding five year statute 
of repose for claims against architects, contractors, and builders unconstitutional); Hanson v. Williams 
County, 389 N.W.2d at 328 (invalidating similar ten-year date-of-use statute of repose for products-liability 
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by the statute of limitations, would at least have an opportunity to have a day in court to 
try the substantive merits of potential claims and legislatures could focus their time on 
other matters. Because statutes of limitations would still bar stale claims, by no means are 
the judicial floodgates going to be opened under this author's approach to statutes of 
repose. Just because a potential claimant is allowed a day in court does not translate into 
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
In addition to arguments that statutes of repose are unconstitutional, claimants 
have attempted to argue that statutes of repose violate federal due process.114 A Kansas 
court, however, concluded “although [a statute of repose] works a hardship on particular 
plaintiffs, there is no violation of due process in its application.”115 Furthermore, medical 
malpractice statutes of repose have been held not to violate due process since the 
legislature’s concern with shortening the lapse of time between treatment of a patient and 
a potential medical malpractice suit is considered a permissible legislative objective.116
Equal Protection and Statutes of Repose
The most often stated general justification for the constitutionality of statutes of 
repose is the oft-quoted statement that “it is no requirement of equal protection that all 
evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.”117 Although the creation of 
classifications at all might seem counterintuitive to any notion of equality, this typical 
judicial justification for not invalidating, on equal protection grounds, an act of the 
legislature, is merely an excuse for a court evading equal protection analysis. Courts also 
claims); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 684-86 (Utah 1985) (invalidating ten-year date-of-
use statute of repose for products liability claims).
114
 Lourdes High School, Inc. v. Sheffield Brick & Tile Co., 870 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1989).
115 Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d at 320.
116 Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d at 411-12.
117 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. at 110.
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evade their responsibility to ensure equal protection by reviewing a statute's regulatory 
classifications’ under a standard of “reasonableness,” granting the classification “fairly 
broad leeway” and not questioning the legislature “unless the classification is clearly 
arbitrary and has no rational basis.”118
Many courts, in upholding a statute of repose against an equal protection 
challenge, offer, in consolation, the statement that “we do not necessarily agree 
philosophically with the results we reach. We can only construe the statute as it is, not as 
we think it ought to be.”119 In one case the Sixth Circuit concluded that “we cannot say 
that the legislature’s decision to limit § 29-28-103 to those defendants in the 
manufacturing and distribution chain, who have control over the cost and availability of 
products, is irrational.”120
These rationales are overly absolute and naively simplistic because they fail to 
explain why a statute of repose is being limited only to certain types of claims and to 
such claims only against certain categories of persons. A court should not simply be a 
rubber stamp for the legislature. Every court has an inherent duty to ensure that every law 
passed by the legislature conforms to the guiding principles set forth in both the state and 
federal constitutions. A court has the duty to strike down statutes that are 
unconstitutional; legislatures cannot be depended upon to enact constitutional statutes 
every time.
Other rationales offered by courts in support of statutes of repose include limiting 
“claims that would be difficult to prove due to difficulty of finding witnesses with 
118 Wyatt v. A-Best Products Co. Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 105.
119 Id., 103.
120 Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d at 1137.
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knowledge of events of ten years before.”121 Also, one court has stated that “long lapses 
of time result in the absence and unavailability of critical witnesses as well as faded 
memories.”122 As mentioned earlier, there is a “strong and legitimate interest in 
preventing litigation of stale claims.”123 However, this interest is fully achieved through 
statutes of limitations.
In addition, statutes of repose are ostensibly designed to “protect defendants and 
the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously 
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading 
memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.124 This interest also is fully 
achieved by statutes of limitation. Finally, courts also want “to avoid the difficulty in 
proof and record keeping which suits involving [older] claims impose.”125 These types of 
interests are fully achieved by statutes of limitations, and these arguments are applicable 
to all types of legal claims, not just specific types of legal claims against certain 
categories of defendants. As a result, these policy reasons should not provide justification 
for a statute of repose that is limited to a specific type of legal claim against a specific 
category of persons.
The future of Statutes of Repose and Equal Protection Analysis
Some courts have concluded “that there was no close correspondence between the 
‘legislative goal of providing certainty in litigation or of reducing insurance costs’ and 
121 Stutts v. Ford Motor Co., 574 F. Supp. 100, at 104 (1983).
122 Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, at 411 (8th Cir. 1982)
123 Id. at 411. See also Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency., Inc., 321 U.S. at 349.
124 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117. See also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322, n. 14 
(1971); Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Chase Securities Corp. v. 
Donaldson, 325 U.S. at 314; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913); Bell v. 
Morrison, 1. Pet. 351, 360 (1828).
125 Hoffner v. Johnson, 660 N.W.2d at 917, quoting Sanborn v. Greenwald, 39 Conn. App. 289, 664 A.2d 
803, 811-12 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
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the classification established by the statute of repose.”126 Consequently, amendments to 
statutes of repose, based upon changes in attitudes and progress in understanding how to 
better take care of society as a whole, should occur as inevitable aspects of the human 
experience. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, we should no more expect an adult to wear 
the clothes they were given as a child than to expect all laws from the past to adequately 
govern the society of today.
An assertion that a judge does not have authority to invalidate a statute of repose 
is no more a valid argument than an argument that a judge is compelled to interpret a 
statute of repose a certain way. Furthermore, when considering the constitutionality of a 
statute, a court “may consider unarticulated, as well as articulated, legislative purposes 
and goals.”127 It is imperative for a court to determine the constitutionality of a statute of 
repose rather than simply determine the legislative intent behind the statute.
Statutes of repose also might be invalidated under the equal protection clause's 
strict scrutiny test on the grounds that the statute is infringing upon a newly-recognized 
fundamental right. Courts should recognize a new fundamental constitutional right that is 
infringed by a state statute of repose applicable to environmental and toxic torts claims 
and would be protected by the strict scrutiny test of equal protection. The right to a clean 
environment should be considered a fundamental right that is infringed by a state statute 
of repose that applies to an environmental or toxic torts claim and that is protected under 
strict scrutiny, since it is the foundation for many of the other recognized fundamental 
rights. This right should include the right to protection of personal bodily integrity.
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An environmental or toxic torts claim seeking damages from a disease caused by 
exposure to a hazardous substance should be considered within this fundamental right to 
protection of bodily integrity. The Supreme Court already recognizes a fundamental right 
to bodily integrity.128 Bodily integrity is certainly furthered by a clean environment. Once 
the right to a clean environment and a healthy body are recognized as fundamental, any 
statute affecting these rights would be reviewed by a court under strict scrutiny. Under 
strict scrutiny evaluation, statutes of repose that apply to an environmental or toxic torts 
claim related to the right to a clean environment or to a healthy body would be found to 
be the unconstitutional leviathans that they are.
A court, however, is unlikely to accept any argument in favor of either a right to a 
clean and healthy body or a right to a clean environment as a fundamental right, all the 
more so given that access to a public education is not recognized as a fundamental right 
in this country.129 Nonetheless, protection of health, education and environment should be 
recognized as fundamental rights even if current courts are reluctant to so rule. If this 
argument is accepted by the courts, there can be no rational basis for a statute of repose 
that provides an exception for an illness from exposure to asbestos or silicon gel 
implants, while not providing an exception to claims for illnesses resulting from exposure 
to environmental pollutants and toxins. The minority of courts, which have stated that 
“when we are dealing with human life and safety we believe that more is required for a 
128
 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that state 
inmates had a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to refuse mandated medical treatment in a state run 
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justification than a reference to the economics of suppliers of goods,”130 are “ahead of the 
tide” in this respect.
The argument, that a right not specifically delineated by the Constitution is a right 
that should not be recognized by the courts as a fundamental right protected by strict 
scrutiny analysis, is overly simplistic and all too often an excuse for inaction. Justice 
Douglas commented that “there is, of course, not a word in the Constitution, unlike many 
modern constitutions, concerning the right of the people to education or to work or to 
recreation by swimming or otherwise. Those rights, like the right to pure air and pure 
water, may well be rights retained by the people’ under the Ninth Amendment.”131 Justice 
Marshall would agree, having stated “it will not do to suggest that the ‘answer’ to 
whether an interest is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis is always to 
be determined by whether that interest ‘is a right . . . explicitly or implicitly guaranteed 
by the Constitution.’ I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to 
procreate, or the right to vote in state elections, or the right to an appeal from a criminal 
conviction.”132 This would later prove prophetic as the Supreme Court in Plyler
suggested that the Constitution guarantees certain rights, such as the right to participate 
equally in state elections, even though they are not ‘explicitly or implicitly guaranteed’ 
by the Constitution.133 Furthermore, “the Constitution does not forbid the creation of new 
130 Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 2000 ND 111 at P7, 611 N.W2d 168 (2000); Hanson v. Williams 
County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 328 (1986).
131 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. at 233-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n. 15 (1982); See also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75 
(1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977).
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rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible 
legislative object.”134
Although the United States Congress has not yet enacted any federal statute of 
repose, any federal statute of repose would be subject to an Equal Protection challenge 
because the Fifth Amendment due process clause is interpreted as containing an equal 
protection requirement applicable to the federal government.135 When a federal statute is 
challenged on equal protection grounds, the court can find that the United States 
Congress had implied objectives for enacting the statute without specifically stating the 
legislature's objectives in enacting a statute.136 For example, attempting to assist 
manufacturers with their business plans is a legitimate governmental interest; however, 
passing a statute of repose limiting liability of a business to only a few years in order to 
protect potential business defendants is unreasonable. Such statutes are unconstitutional 
because they deny the fundamental rights to due process, equal protection and bodily 
integrity guaranteed by the Constitution.
Although a federal court is “bound by plain language” if “Congress did not 
express a contrary intent,”137 Congress cannot possibly legislate for every contingency; it 
is no giant leap of judicial effort to interpret what the intent and logical extrapolations of 
a federal statute may allow. A statute of repose may be both specific (the type of 
manufacturer or industry protected), yet also hopelessly vague (why are certain products 
134 Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 122; see also Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927); 
New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 
(1917); Wilmington Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 74 (1907).
135
 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1974).
136
 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The state of California attempted to argue that 
even if a state statute interfered with Executive Branch foreign policy, the United States Congress 
authorized a state law of this sort by two separate acts. While California was not successful on this 
argument, it was a 5-4 decision; thus leaving the door open for future similar arguments.
137 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d at 364.
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granted different periods of repose?) A court cannot hope to glean a rationale as to the 
Congressional intent for such distinctions since they are arbitrary and without a rational 
basis. The reason for the federal separation of powers doctrine is for one branch of 
government not to have too much power. For federal courts to be hand-tied by the U.S. 
Congress is not what the founders of the United States of America intended.138
A legislature should not have free reign to pass unconstitutional statutes of repose, 
which courts blithely uphold as constitutional without any adherence to constitutional 
principles. A blind and simplistic presumption that all statutes of repose are constitutional 
is dangerously naïve. One need only look at legislation from the antebellum American 
South to see why this posture is fraught with danger.139
Claims based upon exposure to asbestos and silicon gel breast implants are 
already granted exceptions to some state statutes of repose based on long latency periods. 
These exceptions would seem to indicate that claims based upon exposure to any 
hazardous substance with a long latency period should be granted an exception as well.
In § 9658 of CERCLA,140 Congress did attempt to nullify unjust statutes of 
limitation by providing exceptions to state statutes of limitations.141 Federal courts, 
however, have found ways to hold that state statutes of repose do not violate § 9658 of 
CERCLA, which states: “if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified 
in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date 
138
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which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall 
commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in 
such State statute.”142 The 5th Circuit has commented that “CERCLA’s legislative history 
indicates Congress intended for § 9658 to preempt a state statute of limitations that 
deprives a plaintiff who suffers a long-latency disease caused by the release of a 
hazardous substance of his cause of action, but not to preempt a state statute of 
repose.”143 However, § 9658 does not specifically refer or apply to statutes of repose; as a 
result, many courts will not use the statute of limitation language in § 9658 as indicating 
congressional intent to strike down statutes of repose.
A legislature should not be viewed as acting rationally if it enacts a statute of 
repose under which a claim based on an exposure to toxic environmental carcinogens that 
result in breast cancer would not be permitted while a claim based on breast cancer 
resulting from a silicon gel implant would be permitted to be tried by that statute of 
repose. No rational distinction can be made between long latency periods for exposure to 
asbestos versus exposure to another environmental toxin. Any such distinction should be 
found by a court to be irrational. The asbestos and silicon gel breast implant exceptions in 
statutes of repose allow a right to trial of a claim in court to some injured individuals, 
while denying a day in court to other injured persons. Courts should not sit back and do 
nothing in such a situation on the grounds that only the legislature can act in the area of 
statutes of repose.144 Courts should strike down unconstitutional statutes of repose rather 
than wait for the legislatures to enact a conforming statute. Often, a court decision 
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144 Winningham v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16388 (6th Cir. 1998).
37
striking down an unconstitutional statute is the only action that will galvanize a 
legislature to act properly.
Conclusion: Courts should hold Statutes of Repose to be Invalid under the Constitution
Courts should hold that a statute of repose that only applies to a particular type of 
legal claim (such as only to product liability claims or only to product liability claims 
other than asbestos and/or silicon gel breast implant cases) is invalid under the equal 
protection clause of the United States Constitution because it irrationally discriminates 
against only particular types of legal claims in violation of the rational basis test required 
under equal protection. In addition, if a state has a statute or statutes of repose that 
apply/applies to all legal claims, this statute or statutes, in order to comply with the equal 
protection clause’s rational basis test, must establish a reasonable repose period for each 
type of legal claim.145 A reasonable repose period for each type of claim should be based 
upon the relevant latency or discovery period for the disease or injury upon which a 
particular legal claim is based.146
Statutes of repose that have an unreasonably short period of repose should be 
invalidated by the courts in the states in which they are still permitted. At the very least, 
the period of repose in a statute of repose should be lengthened by legislatures, either as a 
gradual step or as a compromise. While such statutory amendment is a legislative task, 
courts should highlight the need for such legislative action by holding that a statute of 
repose is unconstitutional when the statute has a discoverability period that is 
145
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unreasonably short when compared to the latency period or discoverability of the disease 
upon which the plaintiff's underlying legal claim is based.
The fact that in some states asbestos and gel implants are granted an exception to 
statutes of repose, based chiefly on a long latency period, would seem to negate any 
logical basis for a statute of repose that bars, after a period of time shorter than this long 
latency period, a claim arising from injuries caused by a similar product or exposure to a 
substance with a similarly long latency period. Many diseases and illnesses resulting after 
a long latency period share several facets with the diseases and illnesses resulting from 
asbestos or gel implant exposure. Distinctions drawn in a statute of repose between these 
recognized exceptions and other illnesses are irrational. A characterization or 
classification that is irrational or has no rational basis is a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
